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Abstract
In this contribution, we investigate how the role of cities in the governance of refugee integration has changed as a conse-
quence of the Europeanization of asylum policies into a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) in conjunction with the
“refugee crisis” of 2015, which this CEAS turned out to be unable to adequately cope with. We will answer this question by
first giving a quick overview of scholarly thinking on the role of the city in global issues in general, and in migration issues
in particular. After this we provide an exploratory analysis of the role cities presently see for themselves as cities, as well
as jointly organized in European networks.
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1. Introduction
There is an important stream of literature arguing for
a more local approach to global issues in general and,
though less so, migration issues in particular. Authors
such as Benjamin Barber and Saskia Sassenwho famously
coined the concept of the “global city”, have noticed the
political power and agency of cities in today’s globalized
world. Normally, states assume responsibility for those is-
sues, yet citiesmay be better equipped to dealwith them.
Barber (2013) argues that we need a “global parliament
of mayors” and implies that the centre of global govern-
ing should be within the city. Even though Barber’s argu-
ment is slightly provocative, his reasons and arguments
provide a new theoretical paradigm to look at the role
of the local level within multi-level governance. In the
field of migration studies, a “local turn” has taken place
(Caponio & Borkert, 2010; Zapata-Barrero, Caponio, &
Scholten, 2017). Where previously migration, refugee
and asylum policies were by and large understood to be
national in nature (e.g., Doomernik & Jandl, 2008), more
recently, and especially after the 2015 “asylum crisis”,
research increasingly includes the lower levels of gover-
nance, such as the special issue of the Journal of Refugee
Studies on local refugee policies (Glorius & Doomernik,
2016). A growing academic appreciation of the impor-
tance of multi-level governance, notably in the European
Union (EU), has come together with the highly visible re-
alities of the said “crisis” which have largely played out at
the local level (Doomernik & Glorius, 2016).
The present contribution focuses on cities and their
networks as increasingly important players in the EU
and its member states’ response to the arrival of asy-
lum seekers and refugees. When national sovereignty is
at stake, as is the case with the admission of refugees
and immigrants, individual cities—which we define as
urban administrative units, and usually the lowest rung
of national political stratification—as a rule execute poli-
cies decided upon at the national level. However, we
can observe how cities contest policies or seek and exer-
cise discretion when national policies turn out to be un-
enforceable, politically undesirable or at cross-purposes
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with their specific mandate (e.g., maintaining public or-
der; see, for the Dutch case, Kos,Maussen, &Doomernik,
2016; for the US, Canada and the UK see Bauder, 2017).
Cities steering their own course is thus not particularly
new or unique for Europe. However, it would seem that
two developments together have boosted their role: the
growing Europeanization of asylum policies, thus open-
ing up newopportunities for political venue-shopping for
city governments above the national level; and the un-
expectedly high influx of asylum seekers in 2015, which
put considerable strain on the EU’s ability to jointly deal
with their arrival. In effect, cities all over Europe had
to act in the face of national governments that were
overburdened or even unwilling to take responsibility
(Doomernik & Glorius, 2016). The present article asks
how this has changed the role European cities identify
for themselves and how they organize horizontally and
vertically in response to these new challenges.
Next, we provide an overview of themain arguments
arising out of the scholarly literature as to why cities
claim (and some would say deserve) agency in the gov-
ernance of immigration and refugee integration. Then
we proceed to sketch what the main European city net-
works lobby for. For this we review their policy docu-
ments. In other words: we limit ourselves to statements
issued by local governments, singly and collectively. Ob-
viously, this does not result in a representative image of
what cities’ positions are, for those who do not partici-
pate in networks that clearly promote a larger role for
themselves and (usually meaning) inclusive policies re-
main out of view. Finally, we evaluate in which domains
these present policy ambitions depart from those that
traditionally belong to the realm of urban governance,
and thus those that represent a European “local turn” in
response to the “refugee crisis”.
2. Cities and Governance
A first reason why cities are becomingmore important in
global governance lies in growing populations and ditto
economic impact. Just over half of theworld’s population
lives in cities and these earn 60% of global GDP. Refugees
too predominantly resettle in cities.
Also in terms of political legitimacy, cities have fea-
tures distinguishing themselves from national or supra-
national governments. Mayors often boast approval
rates 2 or 3 times higher than those of national legisla-
tors or chief executives (Barber, 2013, p. 84). Cities are
more intimate to their population than national govern-
ments. For the European Commission, this is one of the
motives for engaging local governments with its policies
(De Mulder, 2017).
A third argument why cities matter for global politics
is the fact that they are politically better suited for it than
nation states. Or at least, as Barber (2013, p. 74) provoca-
tively writes: “Nation states have not shownmuch capac-
ity to rule the world”. According to Barber (2013, p. 4),
in the face of increasing globalisation, cities must be the
agents of change. He identifies two advantages of cities
over states. First, while nation states’ efforts at coopera-
tion can be “crippled by the issue of sovereignty”, cities
do not face such limits. They are thus less likely to be-
come venues of nationalistic politics. Secondly:
The seeming indifference of cities to power politics
and sovereignty, a feature that distinguishes them
from states, is critical to their inclination to out-reach
and networking. They prefer problem solving to ideol-
ogy and party platforms, which is a core strength criti-
cal to their network potential. That they lack appetite
for sovereignty and jurisdictional exclusivity enables
them as agents of cross border collaboration. (Barber,
2013, p. 71)
Similarly, Kratz and Nowak (2017) demonstrate how the
city embodies reason and pragmatism against a rising
populist tide in the EU and the US alike.
In today’s globalizedworld, cities are increasingly net-
worked; they are collaborating internationally in a wide
variety of inter-city networks in which they are quite ef-
fective. We will see below that there are many city net-
works doing productive work in lobbying, policy trans-
fer and policy initiation in Europe’s migration policy field.
Cities such as Stuttgart, Barcelona, Hamburg, Vienna
and Amsterdam have become hubs of urban networking,
spawning new associations almost every year.
Cities appear to possess the unique combination of
representing a level of governance that is local and thus
able to represent pragmatism, efficiency and legitimacy,
but at the same time being able to learn from each other
through horizontal networking, e.g., about how to navi-
gate vertical relationships, and formulating cooperative
solutions with other cities in the world.
3. Cities and Migration
Most immigrants arrive in cities, where they work and go
to school, find houses, do groceries and look for health-
care. Refugees, which we treat as a sub-category of mi-
grants, are in particular need of support from local gov-
ernments in terms of education, language and health-
care. Therefore, immigration is a prime example of a
global issue playing out at the local level, both in the field
of integration and in the field of citizenship. Furthermore,
cities deal practically with immigrants, even though na-
tional governments exercise their role as the sovereign
who decides about admission andmembership for those
who are non-nationals. Indeed, as the Organization for
Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) ob-
serves, the cost of integrating refugees is largely borne by
sub-central governments, which is funded through lump
sum payments from the national level, where the vari-
ous and varying needs of refugees in local contexts is not
taken into account (OECD, 2017).
Next to inclusion and integration policies, national
membership status itself is also defined and acted out
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within cities, especially when this is about more than le-
gal status. As Isin (2000, p. 6) notes: “Global cities are
spaces where the very meaning, content and extent of
citizenship are being made and transformed”.
Varsanyi (2006), Daamen and Doomernik (2014) and
many others describe how citizenship is transformed
within the city. For instance, in many cities in the US,
immigrants without a status are given school board vot-
ing rights and can pay in-state tuition fees of universities
(instead of the tuition fees for non-nationals). Further-
more, the cities either issue the immigrants with driving
licences, or accept certain proofs of identity (such as the
MexicanMatriculas consulares) or locally issued ID cards
in lieu of driving licences or official passports (Bauder,
2017). While in European countries, notably the welfare
states among them, national control regimes tend to be
stricter, these do not prevent the irregular residence of
immigrant and failed asylum seekers. This can result in
the de facto acceptance of their presence by city gov-
ernments. In other words, citizenship can exist in prac-
tice without it being granted by law. The main reasons
for cities to offer this alternative to legally based citizen-
ship can be simple pragmatism in view of insufficient en-
forcement capacities, local economic interests, or priori-
ties within community policing, which aremandates that
are particular to their level of governance (as compared
to national mandates that need to consider wider sets of
interests; Spencer, 2018). In addition, ambiguities in na-
tional policies, resulting in policy gaps (Hollifield, Martin,
& Orrenius, 2014), can force or tempt city governments
to close these gaps at the local level.
Bauböck (2003) similarly argues that in cities, mem-
bership is not given on the basis of abstract notions of
giving consent to enter a bounded community, but in-
stead upon the mere reality of presence and residence
in a place. Next to the classical distinction between na-
tionality by descent (jus sanguinis) and by birthplace
(jus soli), this form of citizenship could be called jus
domicili, i.e., rights based on residence. Consequentially
one could argue for “constitutional politics that would
strengthen local self-government by redefining bound-
aries, membership and rights at the level of municipal
polities”. (Bauböck, 2003, p. 139).
What ismore, theorists and scholars such as Bauböck
(2003) and Barber (2013), De Graauw and Vermeulen
(2016) see a clear role for cities in the field of migration.
Cities “fix andmanage”most practical issues such as inte-
gration, housing,work and education for immigrants, but
they also play a role in shaping and negotiating citizen-
ship itself. Local policies are more likely to provide immi-
grants with equal opportunities and have an eye for the
importance of ethnic diversity and immigrant political
participation (Garcés-Mascarenas & Chauvin, 2016). To
be sure: we should not only be optimistic and simplistic
about cities as agent of integration. Cities can act in exclu-
sionary ways too if electoral realities force them to. For
example, some cities in Spain refuse to register irregular
immigrants and thereby counteract their legal access to
healthcare, and somemunicipalities in Italy exclude irreg-
ular migrants from public housing. Additionally, in some
localities, anti-immigrant parties and attitudes are grow-
ing, which is jeopardizing the inclusion of immigrants at
the local level (Garcés-Mascarenas & Chauvin, 2016).
4. What Role Do Cities See for Themselves When It
Comes to Managing Refugee Migration in the EU?
It is not only scholars arguing for a larger role for the
local level within the migration field. Cities themselves,
and especially their transnational networks, are vocal in
arguing for a more important role. In most if not all pol-
icy documents, statements and initiatives, cities and city
networks emphasize and ask recognition for their impor-
tance in the migration field. Migrants come to cities, and
cities have to take care for migrants, and do so when no
other institution is able to (Council of European Munici-
palities and Regions [CEMR], 2015).
As agents in immigrant policymaking, cities often
claim they are neglected by national governments. In the
remainder of this paper, we ask what role cities see for
themselves in this respect. We look at policy statements,
position papers, letters, initiatives, and the actions of
cities. In order to analyse the role cities see for them-
selves, we have selected a wide array of city networks
(see Table 1). We do not claim to have an exhaustive list
of networks and initiatives. We only surveyed those city
networks that addressmigration policy on their websites.
We started with Barber’s (2013) list of city networks and
initiatives and added networks if they were mentioned
in one of the documents we analysed. We have analysed
all of their published material with the research ques-
tion in mind. It is important to note that in these docu-
ments, there is a natural emphasis on change; on areas
where cities demandmore influence than they presently
have. What is reported partly reflects the current role
cities play and is focused on the future role they see
for themselves.
There are different dimensions to the field of migra-
tion. Do cities want to play a role within all those dimen-
sions? And what are those dimensions exactly?
Alexander (2003, pp. 48–50) offers a useful classifica-
tion of policy domains and issue areas within the migra-
tion field. He identifies four local policy domains. Firstly,
there is the legal-political domain, which addresses the
civic incorporation of migrants/ethnic minorities in the
host polity. This is the dimension where issues of allo-
cation and citizenship play a role. Secondly, there is the
socio-economic domain, which concerns social inclusion
policies. Thirdly, Alexander defines the cultural-religious
domain, which includes policies related to minority, re-
ligious and cultural practices as well as to inter-group
cultural relations. Finally, Alexander points to the spatial
domain, which groups policies with a strong spatial di-
mension (housing, urban renovation, symbolic spaces).
Below we offer an inventory of what role cities en-
visage for those four policy domains. As shall become
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Table 1. List of reviewed city networks.
UIA (Urban Innovative Actions) is an initiative of the EU and promotes and subsidizes sustainable urban development.
Issues include environment, employment, migration and employment (Urban Innovative Actions, n.d.).
Urban Agenda for the EU, hosted by the European Commission, was initiated by the city government of Amsterdam in
2016 and covers a wide range of urban topics, including the integration of refugees (Urban Agenda for the EU, n.d.).
EUROCITIES has close to 200 members and partners. Collaboration is on a wide range of issues and includes refugee
integration (EUROCITIES, n.d.).
The CEMR represents sixty national associations of regional and local governments, who together have 130,000
members, and extends beyond the EU (CEMR, n.d.).
United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) is a global network of which CEMR is the European regional section
(UCLG, n.d.).
VNG International is the international branch of the Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG International, n.d.).
clear, cities have distinct logics in formulating their pol-
icy goals and in identifying their target populations (cf.,
Jørgensen, 2012).
5. Legal Political Domain: Negotiating Citizenship,
Negotiating Policy
City networks voice complaints about the Dublin III regu-
lation,which stipulates as a core principle of the Common
European Asylum System (CEAS) that the European coun-
try an asylumseeker (someonewhoasks to be recognized
as a refugee) first sets foot on, is and remains responsible
for all that follows, be it integration, temporary protec-
tion, or rejection and deportation. This results in uneven
burdens for member states and for their cities, notably at
the EU’s outer borders. Arguably it was this principle that
turned the arrival of Syrian and other refugees in the sum-
mer of 2015 into a crisis of the EU’s professed goal of po-
litical solidarity (Den Heijer, Rijpma, & Spijkerboer, 2016).
It also means that a recognized refugee is not at liberty
to move to a location in the EU where chances for inte-
gration (for instance by finding employment) are highest.
Cities therefore argue for a revised allocation model, out
of solidarity with communities in border regions andwith
refugees trying to enter the EU:
The Dublin III regulation should be revised. This reg-
ulation puts pressure on the external border regions
of the EU, where themajority of asylum seekers enter
the EU and where local authorities are often the least
able to offer a large number of asylum seekers ad-
equate support and protection. (EUROCITIES, 2015a,
p. 3)
Cities voice their (political) ideas on citizenship, espe-
cially the fact that refugees should benefit from free
movement within the EU. EUROCITIES, in the same state-
ment from 2015, argues for:
The establishment of a principle of mutual recogni-
tion of refugee or international protection status and
the possibility of transfer of protection status across
Europe for recognised refugees. They should benefit
from the right of free movement and establishment
in Europe as soon as they are granted refugee status.
(EUROCITIES, 2015a, p. 3)
Similarly, but with the imposition of a single restriction,
CEMR (2015) asserts that “refugees who find a job in an-
other country, should have the opportunity to move to
that member state”.
Furthermore, cities demandmore involvement in de-
signing and implementing a new directive for the alloca-
tion of refugees as part of the CEAS:
Cities should be involved in the implementation of
this directive to allow them to prepare for the recep-
tion of and provision of services to asylum seekers.
(EUROCITIES, 2015a, p. 3)
Without the involvement of local and regional govern-
ments there can be no practical implementation of
the agreements concluded at EU and national levels.
(CEMR, 2015)
Cities moreover identify a distinct role for themselves in
adequately dealing with rejected asylum seekers, an is-
sue that is generally understood to be difficult to solve
from a national level:
City authorities, if they wish to do so, should be more
extensively supported by European institutions,mem-
ber states and international organisations to enable
them to offer quality information to those rejected
and those dropping out of the asylum procedure, as
well as to provide mediation and guidance regarding
the voluntary return option. (EUROCITIES, 2015a, p. 2)
Besides negotiating EU asylum policy, cities may play an
active role in shaping citizenship. As Garcés-Mascarenas
& Chauvin (2016 p. 52) note:
The incorporation of irregular immigrants takes
mostly place at the local level: it is precisely
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there…where the practices of street-level bureau-
crats, the support of non-governmental organisations
and the development and implementation of partic-
ular local policies counteract the exclusionary effects
of immigration policies.
To facilitate this process, city governments for instance
may fund local NGOs working in the field of social and le-
gal assistance. Barcelona offers a very interesting exam-
ple when it turned the municipal census into the basis of
what was defined as ‘resident citizenship’. In effect, ev-
eryone registered in the city is considered a legitimate
citizen, and has rights to healthcare, education, and mu-
nicipal services such as libraries, sports centres and some
social benefits.
But in many cities, citizenship takes shape through
daily practice. For example, the Platform for Interna-
tional Cooperation on UndocumentedMigrants (PICUM)
has written a report together with EUROCITIES on how
cities mitigate the impact of restrictive national policies
regarding access to healthcare services. Where national
governments limit access to public health systems, by re-
quiring residence status in order to receive care, cities
use their authorities to legislate or otherwise act in the
field of health policy or delivery of care. As funders, cities
support initiatives that facilitate improved access to ser-
vices for their undocumented residents, for instance by
providing it for free or anonymously. Examples from the
report illustrate how cities have used a variety of strate-
gies to improve access:
Including funding local clinics in Helsinki and War-
saw; partnering with local NGOs to provide inte-
grated, community-based care in Frankfurt; easing ad-
ministrative burdens in Ghent; campaigning to raise
awareness of the right to health services in Madrid;
and funding coverage for services denied under na-
tional plans in Eindhoven, Amsterdam, Nijmegen and
Utrecht. (Smith & Levoy, 2017, p. 31)
By doing this, undocumented immigrants are included in
the city as residents, and cities are reshaping the—often-
exclusionary—national citizenship policies (for the Dutch
case see also Kos et al., 2016).
But cities can go and do go further. As mentioned
above, Barcelona includes all immigrants in the munici-
pal population register, regardless of their migration sta-
tus within their city, providing them not only with health-
care rights, but also making it possible for them to ac-
cess education, public institutions such as the library,
and even certain forms of benefits (Garcés-Mascarenas
& Chauvin, 2016).
To conclude, cities have their own political ideas
on allocation, settlement, deportation and membership
rules for immigrants. City networks argue for freedom of
movement for refugees within the EU, hereby counter-
ing the current Dublin regulation. Following their logic,
cities also demandmore involvement in decision making
on allocation of refugees at the EU and national level. Fi-
nally, the local level has significant impact on how citizen-
ship works in practice. Cities mitigate national restrictive
policies, and include migrants into the city as residents,
thereby reshaping the actual meaning of citizenship.
6. The Spatial and Socio-Economic Domains:
Autonomy, Policy Transfer and the Request for
More Support
6.1. Labour Market
Often, cities are responsible for the labour market inte-
gration of refugees. In the Netherlands, for instance, we
see how cities have different types of labour market in-
tegration programmes (Razenberg & De Gruijter, 2017).
Dutch cities develop numerous initiatives and seek au-
tonomy for making labour market integration policies.
First, through assessments and intake conversations,
municipalities try to assess “their” refugees’ skills and
strengths. Furthermore, municipalities like Amsterdam
and Utrecht have “case managers” and “job coaches” for
each refugee. Municipalities actively work together with
local companies and employers and actively mediate be-
tween companies and refugees, also for internships and
voluntary work arrangements. They organize visits to lo-
cal companies with refugees, or “meet and greets” for
employers and refugees. What becomes visible too is
that localities often find it easier to integrate refugees
with specific skills into their own labour markets. As a re-
sult of earlier more or less random distribution mecha-
nisms in which all Dutch municipalities had to accommo-
date a centrally determined fixed share of refugees, mis-
matches between labourmarket needs and the refugees’
human capital easily occurred. To counter this problem,
the high-tech city of Eindhoven has developed a labour
market integration policy specifically aimed at techni-
cally skilled English-speaking refugees. In other places,
such as greenhouse regions, demand is mostly for low-
skilled agricultural workers, whereas these municipali-
ties have problems integrating highly educated refugees
(Razenberg & De Gruijter, 2017). Allocation of refugees
could be improved to make the host society a better
match overall with the incoming human capital. Finally,
private and civil society initiatives are also very relevant
in labour market integration, and cities often cooperate
with those. In Finland, for instance, cities support various
initiatives, which help to connect refugees to available
jobs (EUROCITIES, 2016).
6.2. Housing
The city networks we reviewedmention that housing im-
migrants is among their largest challenges. Often, hous-
ing is scarce and pricy. Also in terms of public policy legit-
imacy and the general public’s awareness, housing plays
a large role. Cities work with their own housing stock,
use mediators to reach out to private landlords, refur-
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bish empty office buildings, and coordinate solidarity ini-
tiatives among residents willing to host refugees in their
homes (EUROCITIES, 2016). Yet national rules and regu-
lations make it hard to fundamentally change the situa-
tion. As the cities assembled in the Urban Agenda for the
EU remark:
The exceptions for situations of ‘humanitarian ur-
gency’ should become more accepted as a common
practice. For example, exceptions should be made in
the EU sphere of competition and internal market for
certain forms of housing for refugees. (Emergency) ac-
commodation such as tiny houses, modular housing,
containers, laneway housing etc. should be subject to
more lenient rules on state aid and public procure-
ment. (Urban Agenda for the EU, 2017, p. 39)
Meanwhile, cities have the possibility to combine hous-
ing with their goal of social inclusion: civil society and
housing corporations can be included in the policymak-
ing. For instance, in Antwerp, young unaccompanied
refugees who come of age and are no longer eligible
for welfare benefits can participate in a housing scheme
where they are matched with young local citizens (bud-
dies) and given training and job opportunities (Urban
Innovative Actions, 2018). In Amsterdam and Utrecht,
local governments together with housing corporations
and civil society actors have created projects in which
refugees live together with students (who likewise ben-
efit from access to affordable, temporary housing).
Finally, communication between national govern-
ments and the local level may have to be improved, as
becomes clear from the EUROCITIES (2016) report:
Communication with national authorities has proven
difficult in some instances, with cities such as
Barcelona, Bilbao and Nantes reporting that they
were either informed late in the process or never at all
about how many asylum seekers they should expect
under the EU relocation scheme and how their recep-
tion would be funded. Many cities report that they
have effectively acted instead of their competent na-
tional authority to provide reception to asylum seek-
ers and migrants. (EUROCITIES, 2016, p. 7)
6.3. Social Inclusion
In terms of social inclusion, more broadly defined than
labour market integration, there are interesting initia-
tives from cities. We found three examples through the
subsidy platform for Urban Innovative Actions (2018):
The city of Bologna will look to foster the social, cul-
tural and economic inclusion of migrants integrating
different services in a new refurbished centre and al-
lowing migrants to acquire new skills and build micro-
enterprises for community services in the neighbour-
hood. Asylum seekers’ entrepreneurial skills will be
capitalised in the city of Utrecht combining commu-
nity housing and learning activities. The city of Vienna
will create a one-stop-shop for refugees that will
bring together municipal services with grass roots
initiatives through new forms of social cooperatives.
(Urban Innovative Actions, 2018)
Also here the great autonomy of cities becomes clear, as
well as their opportunities to work together with civil so-
ciety and other local actors.
In the sphere of spatial and socio-economic integra-
tion, we can see just how much autonomy and creativ-
ity cities have to address challenges. Local governments
have the advantage of being close to their population:
the immigrants as well as employers and civil society.
Case managers and coaches, as well as the practice of in-
take conversations, allow cities to get to know refugees
and to match them properly to the labour market. Con-
tacts with housing corporations and civil society make it
possible to use housing for integration of refugees and
other migrants as well as promoting overall social co-
hesion. However, national and supranational logics also
frustrate such local policies. The allocation of human
capital, which is determined by national governments
and—indirectly—by theDublin regulation often does not
match local labour market needs. And national housing
rules are often too strict to allow for flexible and emer-
gency housing which is necessary if municipalities find
themselves with the task of housing large groups at once.
What we have not found much trace of are big city
interests in the cultural-religious domain. One might sus-
pect two reasons for this. First of all, the present urgency
lies with the practical reception and integration of re-
cently arrived refugees and less so with social cohesion
among the cities’ population at large. The main purpose
of the networks we have surveyed seems to be policy
change for practical purposes, and changes to that end
in the relationship between levels of governance. Sec-
ondly, earlier city networks did extensively address social
cohesion and inter-cultural relations, e.g., the Cities for
Local Integration Policies (CLIP) program (Penninx, 2015).
Indeed, generally speaking we do know cities tend to
consider this to be an important policy field (Alexander,
2003; Jørgensen, 2012).
6.4. Municipal Foreign Policies
Interestingly, we also came across policy domains which
fifteen years agowere not identified by Alexander (2003),
in all likelihood because their emergence is more recent.
We see that city networks may take up a role in
formulating transnational (i.e., beyond the EU) policy.
One instance of a foreign-oriented network of munic-
ipalities is VNG International. VNG is the Association
of Netherlands Municipalities, which reaches out with
the aim of strengthening democratic local government
worldwide by offering expertise. Its network is thus less
aimed at sharing, mutual learning between equal part-
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ners and common lobbying than the other networks
we came across. The projects of VNG International are
manifold, but here again the relevance of migration and
refugee protection for the local level becomes very clear.
One example of its projects in the migration field is a
local government resilience programme for the Middle
East and North Africa. The objective is to “strengthen
resilience at local government level in order to improve
living conditions of the local population and refugees in
host communities and refugee settlements” (VNG Inter-
national, 2018c). Another project is located in Jordan and
providesmunicipal assistance to Al Zaatari refugee camp.
The municipality of Amsterdam sent experts from their
offices to develop an integrated (scenario) planning ap-
proach for the camp, to address service planning bottle-
necks arising from the Syrian refugee influx, and to assist
the local government to develop a development vision
and plan for the region (VNG International, 2018b).
Also in Georgia, rights of migrants are protected, es-
pecially aiming to protect them from exploitation and
trafficking, offering durable livelihood solutions for re-
turning migrants, prevention of irregular migration and
capacity building for NGOs working in migration manage-
ment. VNG International also “assists in the fight against
irregularmigration” (VNG International, 2018a). In this in-
stance, the VNGworks in linewith European and national
policy goals: migration is linked to security issues such as
trafficking and irregular migration (Huysmans, 2006).
CEMR also developed some notions resembling a for-
eign policy. For instance, this city network called for a
more critical assessment in terms of international and
European human rights and asylum law of the so-called
“Turkey deal”. It also explicitlymentions forms of transna-
tional solidarity with mayors from across Europe and the
Balkans, Turkey, and the Middle East, notably Lebanon
and Jordan. For instance, it requests that the EU respects
local and regional self-governance, for instance in rela-
tion to refugee reception in the region.
Cities do not only develop an external foreign pol-
icy, but also an intra-European vision. Cities call for sol-
idarity and demand “increased efforts to better coordi-
nate actions in dialogue between local, regional and na-
tional governments and to distribute refugees fairly and
with solidarity across all regions andmunicipalities at the
European level” (CEMR, 2016, p. 3). One important in-
strument for this is policy harmonisation, the need for
which cities often emphasize.
6.5. Policy Harmonisation and Policy Transfer
Related to transnational policies, but a dimension in its
own right, cities take it upon themselves toworkon thehar-
monisation of policies. One of the important goals of the
Urban Agenda for the EU is to do so and to make it more
evidence-based (Urban Agenda for the EU, 2016, p. 14):
There is across Europe a great richness of experiences
and expertise on integration. Sharing this experience
in a systematic way can help enhancing the capacity
of local authorities to develop successful integration
policies in several areas. More structural exchanges
of practices and experiences between different levels
of governance can increase the efficiency and coor-
dination in addressing integration challenges. (Urban
Agenda for the EU, 2016, p. 25)
CEMR (2016) demands further development of the part-
nership mechanism and a co-decision spirit between EU,
national, regional and local levels within existing institu-
tional structures. It argues that there is a need for specific
funding for the local level. CEMR welcomes the initiative
to allocate extra money towards migration issues, but it
wants it to be allocated to the local and regional levels. It
also argues that the local level has to domore in terms of
exchange, peer reviewing and sharing of best practices.
UCLG (2018) likewise calls for the promotion of peer-
to-peer learning. They work for instance on building
a network of local and national stakeholders in the
Mediterranean at city level aiming to reinforce knowl-
edge and capacities of local politicians, officials and prac-
titioners. Besides, they report organizing many mayoral
forums and conferences aimed at sharing good practices.
To conclude with Barber (2013), cities are indeed
well connected and formulate and practice “foreign poli-
cies”. We see how cities formulate statements, as well
as engage in actions, in solidarity with localities outside
Europe, as well as demand solidarity among cities within
Europe. VNG International dispatches experts beyond
the EU’s borders and EUROCITIES calls for solidarity with
the EU’s border towns. Such internal solidarity should be
achieved by policy harmonisation, for which the differ-
ent city networks have taken various initiatives, such as
conferences and platforms. These activities invariably go
hand in hand with demands for more and direct funds
from higher levels of governance, such as the EU.
6.6. Public Awareness and Legitimacy
Besides demanding a larger role within the implementa-
tion and design of the CEAS, cities see a role for them-
selves in involving local civil society organizations and
in managing awareness and consensus building amongst
the local population. As Urban Innovative Actions writes:
Cities have shown to play an important role in pro-
moting positive public perception of migrants and
refugees and an understanding among the public of
the need and obligation to grant them protection. In
order to encourage a positive reception work is being
done by local governments and NGOs to help people
understand migrant and refugee experiences. (Urban
Innovative Actions, 2018)
CEMR and EUROCITIES explicitly mention this dimension
and argue that the EU should providemore financial sup-
port for cities to manage public opinion.
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EUROCITIES, in a letter to the European Commis-
sion and national leaders, states that European cities are
committed to non-discrimination and equality, and that
these see a role for themselves in countering xenophobic
and nationalistic narratives:
There remains a nationalistic, isolationist and at times
xenophobic undertone to some debates at national
and European level. This does nothing to support the
long term integration of refugees and asylum seekers.
(EUROCITIES, 2015b)
One concrete way of doing this is through “neighbour-
hood information sessions” as described in a EUROCITIES
(2016) report on the city of Utrecht:
Utrecht hosted five neighbourhood information ses-
sions to address residents’ concerns about the ar-
rival of refugees, and in particular the establishment
of two refugee centres in key locations in the city.
These sessions involved a range of stakeholders, in-
cluding the vice mayor responsible for refugees and
asylum seekers, the police chief and a doctor working
in asylum centres. Neighbourhood stakeholders were
invited to discuss issues such as safety with the po-
lice, local policy with the vice mayor, and volunteer
activities. The meetings helped to reassure residents
and encourage a positive attitude towards refugees.
(EUROCITIES, 2016, p. 9)
7. Conclusion
We have shown that city governments “feel” they are un-
derestimated and even neglected as agents in national
and European policymaking with regards to migration,
both in general terms as well as for refugee integration.
Many documents studied call for more involvement of
cities by emphasizing that migration is a local issue. We
found that cities seek a bigger role in the legal-political
domain: demanding involvement in the content of mem-
bership (for instance, by lobbying for free movement
of refugees within the EU), shaping citizenship practices
(for instance, by giving undocumented immigrants ac-
cess to services that go beyond the national legal frame-
work), but also by demandingmore involvement in policy
making and implementation of a future refugee realloca-
tion scheme within Europe. We see that within the legal-
political domain the focus is on a reform of the CEAS: giv-
ing input for this reform, but also demanding influence
in the policy making and implementation of a reformed
CEAS. Thus, on top of being actors who close the policy
gaps caused at the national level (which in turn cannot be
seen as detached from the European level), cities identify
larger roles for themselves and in their own right, orga-
nized horizontally as networks addressing refugee issues.
To this end they each and jointly seek new and expand ex-
isting vertical relationships, bypassing the national level
and tapping into European resources.
Secondly, cities develop innovative initiatives regard-
ing spatial and socio-economic inclusion of recently ar-
rived refugees, especially focusing on labourmarket inte-
gration. They bank on the advantage of being relatively
close to both immigrants and local companies, and on
working as mediators to match the demand and supply
of human capital. Furthermore, cities put a lot of effort
into ‘seeing’ and knowing refugees’ skills and expertise
in order to be able to match them to a job. Local compa-
nies are actively included and cooperate with municipal-
ities. We have also seen how, in stark contrast, the allo-
cation of refugees organized at the level of national gov-
ernments appears to much less—or indeed not—match
the local demands for labour.
Finally, we find that cities see immigrants more nat-
urally as social capital as compared to the national level
where the “immigrant as a threat” imagery is more read-
ily invoked. Indeed, the overall message in the city net-
works’ policy statements is one of inclusion and respect
for human rights and thus an explicit willingness to act
where national governments fail to deliver in both prac-
tical and moral terms.
Acknowledgements
We gladly mention that the writing of this article took
place as part of the CEAS evaluation project, which
has been made possible by a grant from the European
Commission’s Horizon2020 programme.Weare also very
grateful to the three anonymous reviewers for their crit-
ical yet constructive and detailed comments.
Conflict of interests
The authors have no conflicting interests to declare.
References
Alexander, M. (2003). Local policies toward migrants as
an expression of Host–Stranger relations: A proposed
typology. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies,
29(3), 411–430.
Barber, B. (2013). If mayors ruled the world: Dysfunc-
tional nations, rising cities. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press.
Bauböck, R. (2003). Reinventing urban citizenship. Citi-
zenship Studies, 7(2), 139–160.
Bauder, H. (2017). Sanctuary cities: Policies and Practices
in International perspective. International Migration,
55(2), 174–187.
Caponio, T., & Borkert, M. (Eds.). (2010). The local dimen-
sion of migration policymaking. Amsterdam: Amster-
dam University Press.
Council of European Municipalities and Regions. (2015).
Refugee crisis. For a common European asylum
policy at all levels of government (CEMR Resolution).
Brussels: Council of European Municipalities and Re-
gions. Retrieved from www.ccre.org/img/uploads/
Urban Planning, 2018, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 91–100 98
piecesjointe/filename/CEMR_resolution_refugees_
final_EN-0.pdf
Council of European Municipalities and Regions. (2016).
Call for a common European asylum policy at all lev-
els of government. Brussels: Council of EuropeanMu-
nicipalities and Regions. Retrieved from www.ccre.
org/img/uploads/piecesjointe/filename/CEMR_Call_
for_a_real_common_european_asylum_policy_EN.pdf
Council of European Municipalities and Regions. (n.d.).
Local & regional Europe. Council of European Munic-
ipalities and Regions. Retrieved from www.ccre.org
Daamen, R., & Doomernik, J. (2014). Local solutions for
federal problems: Immigrant incorporation in Mont-
gomery County, Maryland. Urban Geography, 35(4),
550–566.
De Mulder, J. (2017). De uitdagingen voor het migratie-
en integratiebeleid lopen van het Europese tot het
lokale niveau [The challenges for migration and in-
tegration policy run from the European to the lo-
cal level]. Praktijkgids Management Lokale Besturen,
2017(Juni), 150–263.
De Graauw, E., & Vermeulen, F. (2016), Cities and the pol-
itics of immigrant integration: A comparison of Berlin,
Amsterdam, New York City, and San Francisco. Jour-
nal of Ethnic andMigration Studies, 42(6), 989–1012.
Den Heijer, M., Rijpma, J. J., & Spijkerboer, T. (2016). Co-
ercion, prohibition, and great expectations. The con-
tinuing failure of the Common European Asylum Sys-
tem. Common Market Law Review, 53, 607–642.
Doomernik, J., & Jandl, M. (Eds.). (2008). Modes of mi-
gration control and regulation in Europe. Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press.
Doomernik, J., & Glorius, B. (2016). Introduction to
the special issue. Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(4),
429–439.
EUROCITIES. (n.d.). About us. Eurocities. Retrieved from
www.eurocities.eu/eurocities/about_us
EUROCITIES. (2015a). Statement on asylum in cities.
Eurocities. Retrieved from www.eurocities.eu/euro
cities/documents/EUROCITIES-statement-on-asylum
-in-cities-WSPO-9WFNGE
EUROCITIES. (2015b). Open letter from mayors to EU
leaders. Eurocities. Retrieved from www.eurocities.
eu/eurocities/documents/World-Refugee-Day-open-
letter-from-EUROCITIES-mayors-to-EU-leaders-WSPO
-AB4GXE
EUROCITIES. (2016). Refugee reception and integration
in cities. Eurocities. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu/
futurium/en/inclusion-migrants-and-refugees/euro
cities-report-refugee-reception-and-integration-cities
Garcés-Mascarenas, B., & Chauvin, S. (2016). Undocu-
mented migrants: Between inclusion and exclusion.
In V. Mamadouh & A. van Wageningen (Eds.), Urban
Europe: Fifty tales of the city (pp. 51–57). Amsterdam:
Amsterdam University Press,
Glorius, B., & Doomernik, J. (Eds.). (2016). Refugee mi-
gration and local demarcations: New insight into Eu-
ropean localities. Journal of Refugee Studies, 29(4),
429–439.
Hollifield, J. F., Martin, P. L., & Orrenius, P. M. (2014). The
dilemmas of immigration control. In J. F. Hollifield, P.
L. Martin, & P. M. Orrenius (Eds.), Controlling immi-
gration. A global perspective (pp. 3–34). Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Huysmans, J. (2006). The politics of insecurity: Fear,
migration and asylum in the EU. New York, NY:
Routledge.
Isin, E. F. (2000). Introduction: democracy, citizenship
and the city. In E. F. Isin (Ed.), Democracy, citizenship
and the global city (pp. 1–21). Abingdon: Routledge.
Jørgensen, M. B. (2012). The diverging logics of integra-
tion policy making at national and city level. Interna-
tional Migration Review, 46(1), 244–278.
Kos, S., Maussen, M., & Doomernik, J. (2016). Policies of
exclusion and practices of inclusion: How municipal
governments negotiate asylumpolicies in theNether-
lands. Territory, Politics, Governance, 4(3), 354–374.
Kratz, B., &Nowak, J. (2017). The new localism.Howcities
can thrive in the age of populism. Washington, DC:
Brookings.
OECD. (2017). Who bears the cost of integrating
refugees? Paris: OECD. Retrieved from www.oecd.
org/els/mig/migration-policy-debates-13.pdf
Penninx, R. (2015). European cities in search of knowl-
edge for their integration policies. In P. Scholten, H.
Entzinger, R. Penninx, & S. Verbeek (Eds.), Integrating
immigrants in Europe (pp. 99–117). Berlin: Springer.
Razenberg, I., & De Gruijter, M. (2017). De rol van
gemeenten bij arbeidsparticipatie van vluchtelingen
[The role of municipalities in refugees’ labour par-
ticipation]. Utrecht: Kennisplatform Integratie en
Samenleving.
Smith, A., & Levoy, M. (2017). Cities of rights, ensur-
ing health care for undocumented residents. Brussels:
PICUM.
Spencer, S. (2018). Multi-level governance of an in-
tractable policy problem: Migrants with irregular sta-
tus in Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Stud-
ies, 44(12), 2034–2052.
United Cities and Local Governments. (2018). Mediter-
ranean city-to-city migration profiles and dialogue
(C2C Project). United Cities and Local Governments.
Retrieved from www.uclg.org/en/issues/migration
United Cities and Local Governments. (n.d.). United
cities and local governments. UCLG. Retrieved from
www.uclg.org
Urban Agenda for the EU. (2016). Pact of Amster-
dam. Agreed at the informal meeting of EU ministers
responsible for urbanmatters on 30May 2016 in Am-
sterdam, the Netherlands. Europa. Retrieved from ec.
europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/policy/themes/
urban-development/agenda/pact-of-amsterdam.pdf
Urban Agenda for the EU. (2017). Action plan partner-
ship on inclusion of migrants and refugees. European
Commission. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu/futurium
/en/inclusion-migrants-and-refugees/final-action-plan
Urban Planning, 2018, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 91–100 99
-partnership-inclusion-migrants-and-refugees
Urban Agenda for the EU. (n.d.). Urban agenda for the
EU. Europa. Retrieved from ec.europa.eu/futurium/
en/urban-agenda
Urban Innovative Actions. (2018). UIA cities. Urban In-
novative Actions. Retrieved from www.uia-initiative.
eu/en/uia-cities
Urban Innovative Actions. (n.d.). Urban innovative
actions. UIA–Initiative. Retrieved from www.uia-
initiative.eu/en
Varsanyi,M. (2006). Interrogating “urban citizenship” vis-
à-vis undocumented migration. Citizenship Studies,
10(2), 229–249.
VNG International. (2018a). Georgia, promoting migra-
tionmanagement in Georgia through research-based
advocacy, awareness, networking and use of tech-
nologies. VNG International. Retrieved from www.
vng-international.nl/blog/projects/georgia-promoting
-migration-management-in-georgia-through-research
-based-advocacy-awareness-networking-and-use-of-
technologies
VNG International. (2018b). Jordan,municipal assistance
to Al Zaa’tari refugee camp and local governments
in Al Mafraq Governorate. VNG International. Re-
trieved fromwww.vng-international.nl/blog/projects/
jordan-municipal-assistance-to-al-zaa%c2%92tari-
refugee-camp-and-local-governments-in-al-mafraq-
governorate
VNG International. (2018c). Building resilience in
the Lebanon Beqaa’ Valley. VNG International.
Retrieved from www.vng-international.nl/home/
building-resilience-in-the-lebanon-beqaa-valley
VNG International. (n.d.). Welcome to VNG Interna-
tional. VNG International. Retrieved from www.vng-
international.nl
Zapata-Barrero, R., Caponio, T., & Scholten, P. (2017).
Theorizing the ‘local turn’ in amulti-level governance
framework of analysis: A case study in immigrant poli-
cies. International Review of Administrative Sciences,
83(2), 241–246.
About the Authors
Jeroen Doomernik holds an MA in Social Anthropology and a PhD in Human Geography. He was a senior researcher at
the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies (IMES) of the University of Amsterdam, mainly involving policy evaluations
for governmental and international organizations. He also served as a policy advisor for the Dutch Ministry of the Interior.
Presently, he is an assistant professor in political science. His research interests are refugee integration, irregular migration
and human smuggling, and the future of the Common European Asylum System.
Djoeke Ardon is a Public Policy Researcher with a special interest in migration and integration issues. After finishing a
research master at the University of Amsterdam, she worked with Jeroen Doomernik for the CEAS evaluation project,
resulting in this article. Currently, she is working for the Netherlands Court of Audit as a researcher.
Urban Planning, 2018, Volume 3, Issue 4, Pages 91–100 100
